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Abstract
Background: In Quebec, the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was managed using a top-down style that left many
involved players with critical views and frustrations. We aimed to describe physicians’ perceptions - infectious
diseases specialists/medical microbiologists (IDMM) and public health/preventive medicine specialists (PHPMS) - in
regards to issues encountered with the pandemics management at the physician level and highlight suggested
improvements for future healthcare emergencies.
Methods: In April 2010, Quebec IDMM and PHPMS physicians were invited to anonymously complete a web-
based learning needs assessment. The survey included both open-ended and multiple-choice questions.
Descriptive statistics were used to report on the frequency distribution of multiple choice responses whereas
thematic content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data generated from the survey and help understand
respondents’ experience and perceptions with the pandemics.
Results: Of the 102 respondents, 85.3% reported difficulties or frustrations in their practice during the pandemic.
The thematic analysis revealed two core themes describing the problems experienced in the pandemic
management: coordination and resource-related difficulties. Coordination issues included communication, clinical
practice guidelines, decision-making, roles and responsibilities, epidemiological investigation, and public health
expert advisory committees. Resources issues included laboratory resources, patient management, and vaccination
process.
Conclusion: Together, the quantitative and qualitative data suggest a need for improved coordination, a better
definition of roles and responsibilities, increased use of information technologies, merged communications, and
transparency in the decisional process. Increased flexibility and less contradiction in clinical practice guidelines from
different sources and increased laboratory/clinical capacity were felt critical to the proper management of
infectious disease emergencies.
Keywords: Influenza, Pandemic, Public health emergency, Management, Physicians’ perceptions, Mixed methods
exploratory survey
* Correspondence: caroline.quach@mcgill.ca
1Department of Pediatrics, Montreal Children’s Hospital, McGill University
Health Centre, C1242 - 2300 Tupper Street, Montreal, QC H3H 1P3, Canada
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Nhan et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:115
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/115
© 2012 Nhan et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Background
On June 11th, 2009, the World Health Organization
( W H O )d e c l a r e dt h a tt h ec i r c u l a t i n gi n f l u e n z aA
(H1N1) strain had reached the pandemic level; [1]
Canada launched, as planned, a top-down pandemic
response [2,3]. As healthcare management is a provincial
responsibility, this response was carried out by provinces
and territories; each assuming coordination among
healthcare system stakeholders within their respective
jurisdictions. Regional agencies were responsible for the
implementation at the local level. Overall, the Canadian
response was based on the WHO framework, which
outlines essential aspects for an effective response, and
included components of surveillance, healthcare
response, public health intervention, communication,
and command. Communication, amongst all aspects of
an effective public health response [4-6], was identified
as a key element: to share evidence, to aid in risk assess-
ment, healthcare planning, and public health responses
but also to encourage changes in behaviors and to con-
vey messages [7,8].
In the province of Quebec, the vast majority of practi-
cing physicians are members of their respective disci-
plinary association [9]. The Quebec’sC o l l e g eo f
Physicians is legally responsible to ensure physicians’
competence [10] and requires that these associations
provide their members with continuing medical educa-
tion (CME) focused on societal needs and in agreement
with Canadian accreditation standards [11]. In line with
this mandate and in the face of public criticisms [12]
and members’ frustrations with the overall pH1N1 man-
agement, Quebec associations of infectious diseases and
medical microbiologists (AMMIQ) and of public health
and preventive medicine (AMSSCQ) surveyed their
members in preparation for a joint, interdisciplinary
CME activity, to identify learning needs as to WHO
guidelines for effective healthcare emergencies response
and perceived implementation issues as experienced
during the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic (pH1N1).
There is scant literature about physicians’ perceptions
about healthcare system’s management of pH1N1
[13,14]. We report the results of a secondary analysis of
this exploratory survey, describing AMMIQ and
AMSSCQ members’ perceptions of critical issues in




Infectious diseases/medical microbiologists (IDMM) and
public health/preventive medicine specialists (PHPMS)
who were active members of either AMMIQ or
AMSSCQ were eligible to participate.
Survey tool
Two authors (CQ and MDF), involved in the manage-
ment and implementation of the pandemic response at
the provincial, regional, and local levels, drafted a web-
based questionnaire to document physicians’ perceptions
on the pH1N1 response. Items on the questionnaire
reflected the authors’ respective medical-specialty expert
knowledge of the guidelines as well as literature on
effective healthcare emergencies interventions. This
drafted questionnaire was then reviewed with members
of each association’s CME Committee (2 for AMMIQ
and 3 for AMSSCQ).
The final questionnaire was composed of 4 broad
questions, each with sub-questions. The first question
asked whether participants were involved in the pH1N1
management (Y/N). The second question used a set of
multiple-choice drop-down menus and asked partici-
pants to describe their practice profile: specialty, practice
field and setting, and type of health care region. Free
text fields allowed respondents who chose “other” to
further describe their practice profile. The third ques-
tion aimed to document types of difficulties/frustrations,
if any, physicians encountered in their practice during
the pH1N1 episode. A checklist of 22 items grouped in
7 categories was provided and participants were asked
to check off all that applied. Each category addressed a
different aspect of the pH1N1 management: at the clini-
cal and public health level, overall crisis management,
communication process, vaccination, overall manage-
ment of the two pandemic waves, and issues not cov-
ered in previous categories. Within each category,
physicians had the opportunity to report on issues not
previously listed. At the end of each category, they were
also invited to describe, in free text, issues experienced.
The final question was open-ended and asked partici-
pants to suggest improvements for the management of
future pH1N1-like healthcare emergencies. There were
no mandatory questions.
Data collection
T h es u r v e yU R Ll i n kw a se - m a i l e do nA p r i l1 2 t ha n d
15th, 2010 to members of both associations. E-mail
reminders were sent twice to participants and the survey
was closed on May 2nd, 2010. Participation was volun-
tary and both respondents and non-respondents,
remained anonymous.
Analysis
Data (quantitative, qualitative) were analysed to describe
and understand critical issues and suggest improvements
associated with the pandemic response implementation as
perceived by respondents. Descriptive statistics were used
to summarize responses to multiple-choice questions.
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[15]. For this qualitative analysis, open coding was used to
break down free text into small units (meaning units) that
conveyed distinct messages, maintaining participant’s ori-
ginal wording. Codes were assigned to these meaning
units. The data was then reorganized using these codes as
the unit of analysis. The codes were organized into the-
matic categories. These categories, created by one investi-
gator (CN), were then reviewed and reworked by two
others (CQ, RL), using team consensus. The categories
were then ordered into analytic trees (themes) with
branches (subthemes) grouping the categories into higher
and lower levels of conceptual abstraction. Finally, using
concept mapping [16], flowcharts were created in an itera-
tive team process to explore and refine the relationships
between the meaning units, codes, categories, subthemes,
and themes: this concept mapping also ensured an over-
arching understanding of the entire data set. Two core
themes were ultimately determined: Coordination and
Resources. Representative verbatim quotations were then
chosen to illustrate each subtheme of these core themes.
Ethics
The anonymous survey was prepared and administered
j o i n t l yb yb o t ha s s o c i a t i o n ’s CME committees in fulfil-
ment of CME accreditation standards [11]. Preliminary
survey results were presented at a one-day, interdisci-
plinary CME meeting organized around healthcare
emergencies management and involving members of
both associations (also respondents to the survey);
recommendations for improvements of the healthcare
response at various levels were proposed. Participants
suggested that both associations advocate for those
changes and that the survey results be published in sup-
port of these recommendations, which was later adopted
by elected representatives of both associations. We
therefore conducted “a secondary analysis of a suitably
anonymized dataset that does not require ethics com-
mittee review” [17] for publication.
Results
Response rates and respondents’ practice profile
Forty-two percent (134/317) of eligible physicians com-
pleted the survey. Five respondents were excluded, as
they did not indicate their specialty. Practice profiles of
the remaining 129 respondents, representing 39% (68/
173) and 41% (61/147) of AMMIQ and AMSSCQ mem-
bers, respectively, are described in Table 1.
A greater proportion of IDMM (91.2%) than PHPMS
(65.6%) were involved in pH1N1 management. Practice
profiles of IDMM involved and not involved in pH1N1
management were similar. PHPMS involved in pH1N1
management were more likely to practice in the field of
infectious disease (48.7% vs. 31.7%) and in a regional
public health team (87.2% vs. 75.0%) than those who
were not. Other practice characteristics were similar for
both subgroups.
Frequency of issues experienced during the pH1N1
Table 2 summarizes responses to the checklist of poten-
tial issues for the 102 respondents involved in the
pH1N1 episode. Overall, 85.3% (n = 87) of respondents
encountered difficulties or experienced frustrations in
their practice during pH1N1 and this proportion was
similar for both specialties. Issues related mainly - for
IDMM - to laboratories and infection prevention and
control, vaccine availability, communication process
(clinical practice guidelines’ [CPG] dissemination, and
communication routes), and with the overall manage-
ment of the two pandemic waves. PHPMS reported pro-
blems mainly with the decision-making process in the
prioritization and vaccination of high-risk groups. In
addition, more than 50% reported issues with the top-
down management process, communication processes
(CPGs’ dissemination and communication routes), and
patient management at the public health level (expert
committees, case reporting, and epidemiological
investigation).
Qualitative Analysis
Sixty-two of 102 (37 IDMM and 25 PHPMS) respon-
dents (60.7%) involved in pH1N1 provided written com-
ments. Breaking down these comments resulted in 244
distinct meaning units. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy
of groupings that was developed from coding these
meaning units into categories, subthemes, and themes.
Overall, comments could be grouped under two core
themes: coordination, at all levels of implementation of
the pandemic response, and availability of resources
required to manage the pandemic. Open codes asso-
ciated with coordination (n = 180) were more frequent
than those relating to resources (n = 64). The following
sections report the results for each of the two core
themes and their subthemes. Representative verbatim
quotations of the subthemes are provided in Table 3.
Coordination
Issues and suggested improvements with coordination
comprised the following subthemes:
a Communication: A slow communication process, an
overwhelming number of communication sources, and
an overwhelming number of divergent messages, some-
times lacking clarity, were identified as the main pro-
blems. Respondents suggested that these issues were in
part due to communication routes used to relay informa-
tion. Participants mainly suggested improvements to
communication management such as greater centraliza-
tion and use of the Internet instead of teleconferences.
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found that CPGs’ content was inconsistent between the
different pandemic management levels and advisory com-
mittees; physicians were confused as to which to follow,
especially when contradictory. The changing nature and
the slow dissemination of these CPGs were also perceived
as problematic. CPGs were perceived as too rigid to
accommodate particular regional and local situations.
c Decision-Making: Physicians expressed unhappiness
with the top-down management model and speed of deci-
sion-making, which was associated by some to the large
number of people involved at the top administrative level.
Physicians also found that there was a lack of autonomy
and transparency in the decision-making process. Sugges-
tions were made to involve more medical specialists in the
decision-making process and to increase autonomy at the
regional and local levels.
d Roles and Responsibilities: Physicians complained
about increased workload related to pandemic activities,
such as meetings attendance that they found inefficient.
Some found financial compensations inadequate for the
additional workload. Respondents also mentioned that
the exact role of the different actors involved in the pan-
demic was unclear, which generated confusion in the
local management of the pandemic. Suggestions were to
improve meetings’ structure and to better define roles at
the beginning of a healthcare emergency.
e Epidemiologic Investigation: Public health epidemio-
logic investigations were mentioned as an issue, in
particular the changing nature of the case report form.
There was also a concern with how surveillance, model-
ling and analysis of data were handled and with lack of
timely data feedback to the local level. The main sugges-
tion was to increase processes transparency and improve
local access to data.
f Public Health Expert Advisory Committees: Respon-
dents were mainly concerned with the lack of communi-
cation between physicians in the field and expert
advisory committees. They also questioned the creden-
tials of committees’ members and their decisions. Needs
of specific regions were felt as neglected. Suggestions
included increasing speed of dissemination of advisory
committees decisions and provision of committee mem-
bers credentials, as well as increased involvement of
physicians from various disciplines in committees’ deci-
sion-making process.
Resources
This core theme included laboratory-related resources,
patient management, and vaccination process.
a Laboratory Resources: Limited availability of diag-
nostic material and human resources and poor access to
diagnostic tests such as nucleic acid amplification tests
(e.g. PCR) were raised as issues.
b Patient Management: Many patients with influenza-
like symptoms were sent to emergency rooms without
prior evaluation, resulting in overburdened emergency
rooms. Respondents suggested that those patients be
Table 1 Practice profiles of 129 specialist physicians who responded to the survey sent to all members of Quebec




Respondents involved in the 2009
pH1N1 N = 62
All respondents
N=6 1
Respondents involved in the 2009
pH1N1 N = 40
Practice Field
Infectious Diseases 65 (97.0%) 59 (96.7%) 19 (31.7%) 19 (48.7%)
Other 2 (3.0%) 2 (3.3%) 41 (68.3%) 20 (51.3%)
Practice Setting
Clinical Setting 49 (72.1%) 47 (75.8%) 1 (1.7%) 1 (2.6%)
Local Health Team 1 (1.5%) 1 (1.6%) 3 (5.0%) 1 (2.6%)
Regional Public Health
Team
0 0 45 (75.0%) 34 (87.2%)
Provincial Public
Health Team
1 (1.5%) 1 (1.6%) 9 (15.0%) 3 (7.7%)
Other 17 (25.0%) 13 (21.0%) 2 (3.3%) 0
Type of Health Care
Region
Academic 37 (55.2%) 33 (54.1%) 32 (61.5%) 21 (60.0%)
Intermediate 18 (26.7%) 17 (27.9%) 12 (23.1%) 8 (22.9%)
Peripheral 8 (11.9%) 8 (13.1%) 7 (13.5%) 5 (14.3%)
Remote 4 (6.0%) 3 (4.9%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (2.9%)
IDMM: infectious diseases specialist/medical microbiologists; PHPMS: public health and preventive medicine specialists
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Quebec’s 2009 pH1N1
Have you experienced difficulties/frustrations? IDMM (n = 62) n (%) PHPMS (n = 40) n (%)
Overall categories 52 (84.0%) 35 (87.5%)
Patients’ management - clinical level
Overall 49 (79.0%) 10 (25%)
Beds management 16 (25.8%) 0
Case reporting 19 (30.6%) 2 (5.0%)
Laboratories 40 (64.5%) 3 (7.5%)
Patients care 25 (40.3%) 1 (2.5%)
Treatment 24 (38.7%) 2 (5.0%)
Infection prevention and control 36 (58.1%) 6 (15.0%)
Other 1 (1.6%) 0
Patients’ management - Public Health level
Overall 28 (45.2%) 22 (55%)
Expert committees 12 (19.4%) 9 (22.5%)
Case reporting 12 (19.4%) 7 (17.5%)
Epidemiological investigations 9 (14.5%) 10 (25.0%)
Neuraminidase inhibitors prescriptions 17 (27.4%) 5 (12.5%)
Other 2 (3.2%) 8 (20.0%)
Crisis management
Overall 28 (45.2%) 24 (60%)
Top-down 23 (37.1%) 22 (55.0%)
Quebec-Canada 11 (17.7%) 4 (10.0%)
Other 1 (1.6%) 2 (5.0%)
Communication process
Overall 34 (54.8%) 24 (60%)
Clinical practice guidelines (content) 19 (30.6%) 11 (27.5%)
Dissemination of clinical practice guidelines 26 (41.9%) 13 (32.5%)
Communication routes 25 (40.3%) 12 (30.0%)
Other 2 (3.2%) 2 (5.0%)
Vaccination
Overall 35 (56.4%) 25 (62.5%)
Availability of vaccine 21 (33.9%) 10 (25.0%)
Groups at risk 18 (29.0%) 17 (42.5%)
Number of dosage 11 (17.7%) 3 (7.5%)
Administration approach 16 (25.8%) 8 (20.0%)
Other 5 (8.1%) 4 (10.0%)
Management of pandemic waves
Overall 31 (50%) 11 (27.5%)
Availability of epidemiological data on cases 11 (17.7%) 7 (17.5%)
Cases management 9 (14.5%) 3 (7.5%)
Laboratories organization 27 (43.5%) 1 (5.0%)
Other 1 (1.6%) 3 (7.5%)
Other issues not previously covered
Overall 7 (11.2%) 6 (15.0%)
IDMM: infectious diseases specialist/medical microbiologists; PHPMS: public health and preventive medicine specialists
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Page 5 of 8Figure 1 Classification of issues and suggestions mentioned by 62 specialist physicians* who were involved in the management of
Quebec’s 2009 A (H1N1) pandemic.* Infectious diseases specialist/medical microbiologists and public health and preventive medicine
specialists.
Table 3 Representative verbatim quotations (please note: these are examples; the content of some quotations covers
more than one category and thus may have appeared in multiple subthemes in our analysis)
Themes and Subthemes Comments
Coordination
a) Communication “There was too much information, and too many sources”
“There needs to be better coordination between the two specialties”
“Difficult to communicate changing recommendations to different services”
“Use the current network rather than creating a parallel network”
b) Clinical Practice Guidelines “The waiting times to get CPG was long, and like already mentioned, documents were coming from
everywhere”
“Changing and contradicting CPG complicated the situation when it came time to disseminate to other health
professionals and sometimes rendered the infection control guidelines less credible since they were constantly
changing”
“CPGs were not adjusted based on clinical reality”
c) Decision-Making “Very little flexibility... Again, the decisions were unclear and not very well explained”
“Lack of latitude at the regional level”
“Too many stakeholders and too many messages”
“Give more autonomy to the regional-local levels due to differences between different areas”
“It is clear that an interdisciplinary expert committee should work together on the management of pandemics
and other infectious disease emergencies”
d) Roles and Responsibilities “It is frustrating to not be remunerated for the overwhelming number of calls answered and for infection
control management”
“There needs to be a better distinction between hierarchical roles and expert roles”
“Avoid having too many meetings and instead have a better, more transparent structure that avoids daily (and
multiple) changes”
“Clarify roles and responsibilities quickly at the start of crises to the different parties involved”
e) Epidemiologic Investigation “There was a big problem in accessing data (local cases: clinical presentation, severity, etc.)”
“Lack of information in the beginning, late access to pertinent Quebec epidemiological data”
f) Public Health Expert Advisory
Committees
“More openness from experts and less closure of government leaders, professional associations, etc.”
“Very little information given about the experts on advisory committees and from the different levels of
government and public health”
“Difficulty with decisions and conclusions of the committees and treatment recommendations”
“Delay in the transmission of clinical practice guidelines from the Committee of...*”
Clinical Resources
a) Laboratory Resources “Long delays in obtaining results”
“Regional labs should have access to proper diagnostic technologies”
“The number of lab technologists available is insufficient”
“Allow diagnostic PCR analysis at the local level, which will allow faster results and thus better management of
patient beds”
b) Patient Management “Lack of individual rooms”
“Difficulties encountered in transferring patients to intensive care”
“Patients were referred directly to our hospital’s emergency department without prior evaluation”
c) Vaccination Process “Peculiar recommendations for different risk groups”
“Too late to have the most impact”
“Late vaccination of the general population”
“Late access to vaccines; only supplied by one company; lack of non-adjuvanted vaccine for target groups”
* We did not want to name the actual committee
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pital single rooms to accommodate patients with
pH1N1, as well as difficulty in transferring patients.
c Vaccination Process: Vaccines arrived late after the
onset of the second wave of the pandemic and notifica-
tions of availability were last minute. Physicians expressed
disagreement with high-risk group prioritization, especially
in regards to school-aged children and the elderly popula-
tion, who were targeted late in the vaccination campaign.
Respondents proposed approaching group prioritization
based on a better risk assessment. Other suggestions
included earlier accessibility to the vaccine for the general
public and the need for specialized clinics to serve chroni-
cally ill patients. Physicians would also have liked to
receive more information on the vaccine.
Discussion
In this study, the majority of physicians who answered
this exploratory survey reported difficulties or frustra-
tions in their practice during the pH1N1. Quantitative
results suggest that some of the reported issues, such as
access to laboratory material, were specialty-specific
while others, such as communication processes, were
experienced by both groups of physicians.
Exploration of the qualitative data contributed greatly to
the interpretation of the quantitative data. The qualitative
analysis suggested that most difficulties experienced dur-
ing pH1N1 were related to coordination of response
between stakeholders. Most problems were experienced
within the areas of CPG, communications processes, and
decision-making. Communication is especially crucial in
risk management [8] but also in information transfer, such
as infection control measures [18] and new data on disease
processes [19]. Difficulties, resulting from too many differ-
ent and contradicting sources, as well as lack of flexibility,
were the main areas identified as problematic. Various
advisory committees may have interpreted available evi-
dences differently, leading to contradictions. However,
trust in guidelines is highly dependent on believing that
the sources of those guidelines are credible. Transparency
in the decision-making process and decision makers’
credentials is crucial.
As in other studies [20-22], efficient communication
between various actors was felt to be important. It was
s u g g e s t e dt h a tt h ee x c e s s i v e amount of communication
sources and messages might be solved by streamlining
communications and through better use of the Internet
rather than traditional communication routes such as
teleconferences. A need for increased use of newer com-
munication technologies, facilitating transfer of informa-
tion between those on the front lines and authorities,
had been advocated for effective use of CME during
outbreaks and to develop flexible plans [22].
In a public health emergency, actors involved must
acknowledge their roles and responsibilities. Physicians,
who are usually autonomous professionals with impor-
tant decision-making freedom, seemed to have difficulty
with the top-down managerial style that was imposed
with the implementation of the pandemic response.
There may have been a lack of communication about
the managerial approach that would be implemented.
However, the Roundtable on Healthcare and Emergency
Service Sector Pandemic Preparedness, reported that
top-down is essential in emergencies management, but
that a bottom-up method of feedback is also needed to
allow adaptation to varying circumstances [5]. Flexibility
in guidelines and in the decision-making process is also
necessary to enable adaptation by allowing faster
changes [20].
As previously reported [22,23], participants suggested
that a mixed group of experts including top academic
experts [23] in collaboration with front lines of care,
and the public health sector would be beneficial [24].
Public health components are needed to support the
command system in place to ensure evidence-based
decisions and proper coordination of interventions [7].
Some authors have emphasized informational transpar-
ency in several decision-making aspects [8,14] to
improve collaboration [8].
This study is based on a survey designed to develop a
CME intervention and thus has limitations: we relied on
a convenience sample; the questionnaire did not have
established construct validity and recall bias in partici-
pants’ answers is possible.
Conclusions
This paper is one of the few reporting on physicians’
perceptions on management of public health emergen-
cies. Important highlighted areas were coordination
between all involved, decision-making transparency,
greater collaboration of health professionals in decision-
making, greater flexibility, and a better definition of
roles and credentials. Results emphasize the need to
improve transparency and build stronger working rela-
tionships between physicians and health authorities. In
times of emergency, a greater involvement of profes-
sional associations both in the planning of services and
as a communication channel should be considered. Stu-
dies based on other qualitative research approaches (e.g.,
grounded theory) are needed to further understand how
healthcare systems can improve the implementation of
emergency response plans and empower stakeholders
involved. It would also be useful to study identified gaps
between national health authorities’ pandemic plans and
what actually happened in response at the different
levels of implementation.
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